The main focus of this exploration
will be the relation of action to choice and the will in light of
epistemologies proffered by Aristotle and Barthes. First of all, Aristotle
makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary action. The main
difference involves the fact that involuntary action requires two conditions,
1: that the act is performed out of ignorance, meaning that it is outside the
agent, and thus contributing nothing (Aristotle, 121) and 2: that the action
was performed out of ignorance. (Aristotle, 123) Therefore, a voluntary action
means that the action was performed by the actor with his full consciousness
and in freedom with all required information. Compulsion, while distinct and
important to identify in how actions are carried out, still should be part of
the actor, because the will initiates the action, although certain
circumstances may move the intellect to do something that are not in freedom,
one example being that a person threatens your life or another’s life if you do
not perform a certain action. Although you don’t will the action in itself, you
do will the safety of yourself or loved one more than the undesirable outcome
you are being coerced into. With this, the will still ultimately prevails, just
not in the direct result of the action one performs, but the circumstantial
consequence that was added conditionally. Additionally, Aristotle would affirm
that an action done from ignorance is not voluntary because the actor does not
have all the information necessary to properly understand the consequences of
the action. While this is true, and culpability on the actor would be
dramatically reduced, the action itself was still voluntary, and the will is
still totally involved, but ignorance may delegitimize the action, and so the
actor may act in ignorance, but he/she still acts. In other words, the man
still does something, but whether or not he can be held responsible for the
ethical implications is contingent upon the awareness of the consequences of
that action. Aristotle then contends that choice, which is categorized under a
kind of voluntary action, is not related to choices, passions wishes and
opinion. (Aristotle, 129-130) Discipline and self-restraint, when exercised
properly, keep man from taking voluntary actions that are done out of
passionate desires. The reason choice is distinct is because Aristotle
considers it a voluntary action that has been done with deliberation, but
deliberation is not what distinguishes choice. Choice is a voluntary action,
but an action motivated by passion or otherwise is still a choice, and a
decision in passion may still have been thoughtfully deliberate upon. The
distinction Aristotle makes is not one of choice versus voluntary action that
is not choice, but between a prudent, or good, virtuous choice, and a poor,
dishonorable, choice without virtue. Indeed,
deliberation makes a choice more intentional, and almost certainly can be
considered generally to be done either of less ignorance or without ignorance
as a result. Choice, then, is behind every action done by an actor. Whether for
the direct result as it affects them or one they care for or for avoiding an
unwanted result (affecting them or one they care for) in the absence of an
action. The actor chooses, and such choice extends from the will. The degree to
which the will was involved is contingent on the circumstance under which the
action was taken. A choice to do something one would otherwise not choose to do
under threat of an undesirable result otherwise that comes from the action of
the one who threatens initiates the threatened actor to choose to obey. The
actor still has a choice to disobey, but at the end, the actor will choose to
obey or disobey out of a personal cost-benefit analysis of the circumstance
they think will exist after their choice. If a man had a gun to the head of
another man’s mother and threatened to shoot her if he didn’t kill his father,
the man must make the choice based on various factors, such as how likely he
thinks it is the man will actually carry out his threat of killing his mother,
and whether he thinks it likely that if he kills his father, the man will not
kill his mother, These and other factors contribute to the man making a
decision that result in the most desirable outcome he thinks possible.
Citations
1. Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics. Trans. H.
Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Loeb-Harvard UP, 1975. 3-25 (Book I, Chapters, 1-6,
117-141 Book III Chapters 1-3).
